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The President and Choices Not to Enforce
Peter L. Strauss*

The executive branch is often called on to assess how a particular statute it is charged to administer
fits within the larger framework of the law. Professor Johnsen’s thoughtful analysis addresses an important
subset of these circumstances, those in which the President believes that the particular statute is inconsistent
with one or another provision of the Constitution and for that reason should not be enforced. My purpose
here is to explore the context of executive non-enforcement more broadly, in a way that in my judgment
may help in understanding the particular problem she addresses.

Issues of constitutional structure and function are among the most daunting we face. We want to
live in a rule of law society. We have a Constitution that we know and intend to be supreme. And yet its
instructions are vague and dated. It does not in terms create a separation of powers, establish judicial
review, either define our day-to-day government or much indicate the President’s relationship to it.
(Indeed, as Professor Walter Dellinger remarked on the evening before this panel, as our conference
convened, central questions respecting the presidency were not even addressed until the pressured final
eleven days of the constitutional convention.) After more than two centuries, some of the Constitution’s

*

Betts Professor of Law, Columbia University. From 1975 to 1977 I was general counsel to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. That experience doubtless informs my view of executive government as variegated and of the President
as acting chiefly in an oversight capacity, see, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum.L.Rev.573 (1984), in the same way as a person working for the Office of Legal
Counsel, daily experiencing the important questions with government-wide consequences and often directly providing
counsel to the President, may focus on the President’s authority and role.
Thanks are owing my fellow panelists and many others who spoke at or attended this symposium for helping
me to see the issues addressed here more broadly, as to my colleague John Manning; and also to Gaurav Shah,
Columbia ‘00, for invaluable research assistance.
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most fundamental questions remain unanswered. Perhaps, as Alex Bickel once remarked in another
context, that is on the whole a good thing. Some questions are better left as questions, with fringes of
uncertainty, doubt and play that provide flexibility and stability through changing times.

It is perhaps best to begin these impressionistic responses to Professor Johnsen’s ambitious paper
by stating some premises central to my thinking about these problems, about which we might disagree.
First, the clause of Article II we are discussing – which, ending the Section 3 of the Article, might not be
thought the most important in the eyes of its drafters – does not direct the President to faithful execution of
the laws. Between saying that he “shall receive Ambassadors and other public ministers,” and that he
“shall Commission all the officers of the United States,” it says that he is to “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.” In ordinary English, that is, and appropriate in this sense to its placement late in the
text of Article II, it imagines that others are going to be doing the actual executing and that the President
will be overseeing those persons, seeing to it that their execution is faithful. While early Attorneys General
disagreed just how directory that oversight could be, they nonetheless recognized that Congress could
specify oversight, not personal execution, as the presidential role.1 Congress’s statutory assignments of
1

Thoughtful teaching materials on presidential authority, Peter M. Shane and Harold H. Bruff, Separation of Powers
Authority (1995) compare Attorney General Wirt’s advice to President Monroe that his role was to give “general
superintendence” to those to whom Congress had assigned executive duties, as “it could never have been the intention
of the constitution ... that he should in person execute the laws himself,” 1 Op. A.G. 624 (1823), with Attorney General
Taney’s advice to President Jackson that he could lawfully direct a United States Attorney to discontinue an existing
prosecution, 2 Op. A.G. 482 (1831) – advice that acknowledged, however, that “The district attorney might refuse the
President’s order; and if he did refuse, the prosecution, while he remained in office, would go on.” That is, the President
would assure the faithful execution of the laws through removal of one who failed to follow his directions, rather than
substitution of his own decision. At 464-67. Attorney General Cushing, in advice to President Buchanan, would later
assert that “no Head of Department can lawfully perform an official act against the will of the President,” though
(continued...)
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role – at least unless they are unconstitutional, and the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress broad
discretion in making those assignments – are a part of the laws, the faithful execution of which the President
is enjoined to assure.

Second, appreciating the passive voice of the Take Care clause permits us to see more clearly that
the word it uses, “laws,” is not a synonym for “statutes.” It must include the Constitution. The clause is
actually the second place at which the Constitution refers to faithful execution by the President. In the
presidential oath, specified earlier in Article II, he undertakes that he “will faithfully execute the Office of
President of the United States, and will to the best of my ability preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution of the United States.”2 Here the diction is active, not passive, and its only reference to law
is to the Constitution, not to statutes. It would be strange indeed if, having taken that oath, the President
were precluded from considering what would “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution” in the course
of seeing to it that others were faithful in their performance of duty.

Finally, and in keeping with the Gordian character of this knot, in my judgment we need always to
bear in mind the difference between the concrete means by which disputes about the legality of particular
executive branch actions might be resolved, and our aspirational hopes for the President’s own under-

1

(...continued)
acknowledging that “all the ordinary business of administration” is, in statutory terms, placed under the authority of the
Departments, not the President, and “may be performed by its Head, without the special direction or appearance of the
President. 7 Op. A.G. 453 (1855). All of these opinions, with helpful commentary, may be found in H. Jefferson Powell,
The Constitution and the Attorneys General(1999).
2

Art. 2 Sec 1.
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standing of his proper function. In a wide range of circumstances, but not all, the courts will be able to say
whether executive action was lawful or not. To conclude that particular action was illegal, however, is not
to say that it was offensive to the Constitution, as such. Moreover, Congress can significantly shape the
courts’ availability by the provisions it makes for direct review or for intermediary institutions like the
GAO, whose actions can engender judicial proceedings.3 Although, as Prof. Dellinger reminded us, one
of the changes to the Constitution’s provision for the Presidency was to eliminate language permitting him
to be removed for “maladministration,” Congress has at least the raw power to impeach a sitting President
for almost any reason – as it almost did Andrew Johnson or, more recently, William J. Clinton – whether
or not its reason-in-fact constitutes “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”4 It has
lesser political tools, such as the budget. The public, once, has the sanction of denying re-election. And
there is the verdict of history. What seems important to bear in mind is that all of these are devices are
fallible; as Justice Jackson once famously remarked, the Supreme Court does not have the final word on

3

Thus, Congress has provided broadly in the Administrative Procedure Act for judicial review of agency action,
including action “unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,” 5 U.S.C. §706(1). The Supreme Court, while generally
presuming against review of executive branch enforcement decisions, Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) has
recognized that Congress may by statute provide for such review. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975). And by
implicating the Comptroller General’s office in disputes concerning the legality of executive branch expenditures,
Congress has opened the possibility of litigation challenging executive actions involving use of the public fisc. See,
e.g., Alaska Steamship Co. v. United States, 290 U.S. 256 (1933); Ameron v. Corps of Engineers, 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. granted 485 U.S. 958, dismissed on petitioner’s motion 488 U.S. 918 (1988); Lear Siegler v. Lehman, 842 F.2d
1102 (1988), partially vacated en banc 893 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 205).
4

Art. 2, Sec. 4. Save in unusual cases, failure to execute the laws as Congress might prefer they be executed – a
failure that encompasses slow, unenthusiastic or obstructionist administration as well as statutory impoundment – does
not fall within these constitutional grounds for impeachment. The Tenure in Office Act, for violation of which President
Andrew was nearly impeached, in terms made violation of it a crime. 14 Stat. 439, c. 154.
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constitutional meaning because it is infallible; it is infallible only because it is final.5 That the courts regularly
convicted persons under the Alien & Sedition Act did not establish its constitutionality in fact, or that
Thomas Jefferson was wrong to suspend its enforcement when he took office; that Andrew Johnson was
almost impeached is certainly no proof that the Tenure in Office Act was constitutional or that he erred in
disobeying it; and that would be no less true had one more Senator voted to convict.6 Congress’s
impeachment votes no more establish constitutional propositions than its votes on ordinary statutes do.
What we hope is that Congress’s behavior, and the President’s, will be influenced by thoughtful consideration of constitutional text as well as the possible retaliation of other branches, the voters, or future
historians. And so the question here, for me, is how we should prefer the President to imagine his role in
a rule-of-law culture – not what he can get away with, not what the sanctions are, but what it is that his role
under the Constitution, well-imagined, calls on him to do.

Let us start at a little distance from the Constitution, thinking about what wielding executive
authority might entail in any legal culture committed to the rule of law. Problems of executive fidelity to law
are hardly unique to our peculiar if enduring system of divided government and constitutional judicial

5

Brown v Allen, 344 US 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson concurring in the result).

6

It would be a considerable mistake, in my judgment, to consider Congress’s possible impeachment practice simply
as a legal determination rather than as one mixed with large, even overwhelming, elements of politics. Had the Senate
in fact voted to impeach Andrew Johnson, that need not have reflected a judgment in fact about the meaning of the
Constitution; and it certainly would not have determined, for the later Meyers Court, the constitutionality vel non of
congressional reservation of the right to participate in the removal of an officer who had been appointed with the
“Advice and Consent” of the Senate. Any such impeachment verdict would not have been subject to direct review –
what my late colleague Telford Taylor used to describe as an “aconstitutional” question – but that would not have
established any presumptive correctness in it as a reading of the constitutional text.
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review. Resource constraints combine with contemporary senses of the important in all societies, one
imagines, to produce the need for and fact of prioritizations. In consequence, some laws are enforced less
than others – perhaps not at all. Once the prosecutor has preferred, say, prosecutions for sales of narcotic
drugs over those for the sale of contraceptives, once condoms have emerged discreetly onto the shelves
of the local pharmacy, any society might prefer the policy be publicly known and adhered to, rather than
subject its citizens to the hazards of prosecution – prosecution for what might be not random but rather
political or even disreputable reasons.7 Such prosecutions ceased, we should recall, long before any
theory of their constitutional impermissibility gained credibility. They ceased while those statutes remained
in state criminal codes, politically quite safe from removal.

So, too, the imperfections of legislating, even in a parliamentary democracy lacking either political
separation between executive and legislature or a tradition of constitutional review, must regularly throw
up choices about enforcement that must be resolved against enforcement of one or another law, neither
of which has been repealed. Perhaps one favors the new over the old, the specific over the general, the
solution more consistent with the laws generally over the one less so. However the puzzle is resolved, the
7

See Poe v. Ullman,367 U.S. 497 (1961), famously discussed as a possible appeal to statutory desuetude in Alexander
M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 Harv.L.Rev. 40, 58-64 (1961). Later in this conference, the panel on religion
discusses a case (“Branch Ministries”) that might be understood by some as such a case – what appears to have been
the revival of enforcement of that aspect of 26 U.S.C. §501(c) that denies tax exempt status to religious organizations
participating in elective politics, in response to a “Christian Beware” advertisement urging readers not to vote for
candidate Bill Clinton in light of his support of “policies ... in rebellion to God’s Laws.” It had not been applied to the
many ministers, priests and rabbis who had previously urged political positions on their flock – even when the
proceedings were televised, with political candidates in attendance. That the action could be explained as a response
to solicitations of “tax-deductible” contributions to support the ad campaign, as were not directly made in the other
cases, will be an explanation for some – but even so, an explanation that concedes the sting of such an enforcement
decision otherwise.
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executive authority resolving it will have chosen for non-enforcement of a validly enacted statute, and one
that a court might well conclude had remained in full force at the moment of that resolution.

Not only are these problems an inherent part of the executive’s territory, we have high stakes in
its efficient and regular resolution of them. Prosecutorial discretion is made more hazardous, not less so,
if the prosecutor feels free at any point to call up some dusty provision of the criminal law in dealing with
an enemy of the moment. That hazard is underscored by the corollary proposition, that in the ordinary
case executive judgments about which laws to enforce and how much effort to expend in enforcing them
are presumptively unreviewable.8 We might pause for patterns of execution that consistently privilege Irish
over Chinese laundrymen,9 and a legislature might provide for review of enforcement choices in particular
contexts. Yet, in general, neither courts nor legislatures invite such review. Permitting litigation about the
government’s priority choices usually promises more costs than benefits – efforts to seize those priorities
by persons disappointed by the allocations made,10 or diversion, delay, and added expense, at the hands
8

Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).

9

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).

10

“The reasons for this general unsuitability are many. First, an agency decision not to enforce often involves a
complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise. Thus, the agency must not only
assess whether a violation has occurred, but whether agencyresources are best spent on this violation or another,
whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular enforcement action requested best fits the
agency's overall policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has enough resources to undertake the action at all. An
agency generally cannot act against each technical violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing. The agency is
far better equipped than the courts to deal with the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities. ...
“In addition to these administrative concerns, we note that when an agency refuses to act it generally does not
exercise its coercive power over an individual's liberty or property rights, and thus does not infringe upon areas that
courts often are called upon to protect. Similarly, when an agency does act to enforce, that action itself provides a focus
(continued...)
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of those whom (arguably) we have decided it is the most important to control.11

For our President, these ordinary issues of choosing are overlaid by the systems of divided
government and constitutional review. Unlike the Prime Minister of England, he is not “of” the legislature
and our expectation of him, importantly, is that he will act as a check upon it – and vice versa. The
obligation “to take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” is in significant measure an expression of his
unique authority in the allocated functions of government. Such unique or characteristic authorities, the
core of constitutional function, are precisely those, it can be argued, whose exercise cannot be coopted by
the other branches. Congress cannot decide who should be prosecuted, and neither can the courts. As
the Supreme Court put it in Heckler v. Chaney, a case about whether the FDA could be forced to devote
its executing resources to deciding whether a certain drug was safe and effective for human executions, the
“take Care” clause’s commitment of oversight of such decisions to the presidency is precisely the reason
why such “decision[s] have long been regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch” and for

10

(...continued)
for judicial review, inasmuch as the agency must have exercised its power in some manner. The action at least can be
reviewed to determine whether the agency exceeded its statutory powers. See, e. g., FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19 (1929).
Finally, we recognize that an agency's refusal to institute proceedings shares to some extent the characteristics of the
decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict -- a decision which has long been regarded as the special
province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who is charged by the Constitution to ‘take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed.’U.S. Const., Art. II, @ 3.”
470 U.S. at831-32.
11

Decisions to prosecute a person can ordinarily be challenged at the time of final resolution of the charge against
the person proceeded against.
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that reason ordinarily beyond judicial review.12

This is, note, a fairly strong proposition. Legislative granting of excessive discretion to the
President in the area of rulemaking – a power to create rules under circumstances in which a court would
find itself without standards by which to say whether or not they were authorized by law – would constitute
an unlawful delegation. But the executive is not obliged to express reasons for its choices either to enforce
against one person rather than another, or to emphasize one law over another in its allocation of governmental resources. That is its unique and constitutionally protected function. That function can, without
giving rise to constitutional questions about delegation, be committed to the unreviewable discretion of the
executive branch; it is no hindrance that a court might conclude that, in this respect, there is “no law to
apply.”

Congress has on occasion made such decisions reviewable.13 And a painful footnote to Heckler
v. Chaney hints that there might be limits to judicial reluctance to review, leaving open for future decision
the “situation where it could justifiably be found that the agency has ‘consciously and expressly adopted
a general policy’ that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.”14
Statutory impoundment on a large enough scale might draw judicial attention; the Administrative Procedure

12

N. 8 above.

13

Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1974).

14

Heckler, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4, citing Adams v. Richardson, 156 U. S. App. D. C. 267, 480 F.2d 1159 (1973) (en banc)..
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Act provides a handle for that in permitting review for agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed15

Yet we may confidently expect that review will not be available for the choice to abandon
enforcement of former 18 U.S.C. §334 (forbidding the mailing of “every article or thing designed, adapted,
or intended for preventing conception”)16 for other provisions of the criminal code restricting use of the
mails. Even should a court be able to conclude that the limits of non-enforcement discretion have been
crossed, effective judicial relief may be impossible to construct – another reason we might suppose for
judicial hesitation to announce that the obligation to “take Care” had not been faithfully carried out.17 In
the courts of appeals, not in the Supreme Court, we can find accounts of “a 14-year struggle to compel the
Secretary of Labor under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) to issue a field sanitation
standard providing access to drinking water and toilets for several million American agricultural workers
... this disgraceful chapter of legal neglect,”18 or to the Secretary of Agriculture’s refusal to implement a
1978 statute providing the possibility of discretionary foreclosure and debt relief for farmers kept by
“circumstances beyond the borrower’s control” from meeting their farm-and-equipment secured obliga-

15

5 U.S.C. §706(1).

16

See Youngs Rubber Corporation, Inc., v. C. I. Lee & Co., 45 F. 2d 103 (2d Cir. 1930).

17

See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 1167, rehearing denied 468 U.S. 1250 (1984).

18

Farmworker Justice Fund, Inc. v. Brock, 811 F.2d 613, vacated as moot, 817 F.2d 890 (D.C.Cir. 1987).
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tions to the Farmers Home Administration.19 The length of the struggle in the first case,20 the difference
between delaying one foreclosure and securing more than the most grudging administration of this unwanted program in the second, suggest the difficulties in believing that judicial oversight of the “take Care”
obligation can be effective.

The years following these decisions have seen a Supreme Court less and less interested in the uses
of the courts to protect the disadvantaged in their dealings with bureaucracy (a unifying theme of these two
cases and others like them), and more and more reluctant to oversee review of executive decisions that
could be characterized as programmatic.21 That reluctance is connected both to expressions of doubt
about the possible efficacy of judicial relief, and to strong statements about what belongs to the President
(and, more broadly, political processes), and not to the courts. Even when courts do intervene, we might
note, what they determine is that executive authority has been wrongly exercised in the instance; that the
executive was legally in error does not establish that its action was unconstitutional – that it was simply
beyond the power of executive office, correctly understood. So far as the courts have treated any such
cases, that is, they have addressed only statutory issues, implicitly conceding that they lie within the range
in which the executive is entitled to err, without having to be said to have strayed beyond the proper
constitutional dimensions of office.
19

Allison v. Block, 723 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1983); compare United States v. Markgraf, 763 F. 2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1984),
petition for certiorari dismissed 469 U.S. 1199 (1985).
20

Beginning in the administration of Richard Nixon, it ended shortly before George Bush became President.

21

E.g.,Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
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Finally, we can consider another troubling area of conflict, in this case executive-judicial conflict,
that again suggests more scope for executive judgment about the demands of the law than Professor
Johnsen’s analysis seems to imagine. When a government agency has a legal question resolved against it
in the district courts or courts of appeals, the geographical nature of judicial review and the extremely
limited availability of Supreme Court review permit a practice known as “non-acquiescence.” The
government, charged by Congress with uniform national administration of the law in question, may continue
to adhere to its view (at least in cases it cannot be certain would be reviewed in a circuit court that has
already ruled against it), in the hope of persuading another court to its view of the proper law. Second
Circuit judgments are not binding in the Fifth Circuit; and if the agency believes it can prevail outside the
Second Circuit, there is no obstacle to its trying. While not without its critics – particularly when adhered
to after several defeats, or within the same circuit as had initially ruled – “non-acquiescence” has the
imprimatur of the Supreme Court.22 That is to say, the executive branch is obliged to operate within the
law; and ultimately it is for the courts to define those boundaries; yet there is nonetheless substantial
legitimate room for the executive branch to assert and persist in its own readings of legal authority, as the
judicial definition is taking shape.23

22

United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984).

23

Discussion attending the affirmative action panel in this Symposium brought out that, in the wake of Hopwood
v. State of Texas, 78 F.3d 932, cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996), the Department of Education had communicated to its
federal fund recipients in the Fifth Circuit that it regarded the opinion’s broad language about the impermissibility of
affirmative action programs as, simply, dicta and that it would continue to enforce departmental regulations conditioning
grants of federal money on the recipients’ having such programs. The Solicitor General, having represented to the
Supreme Court in his unsuccessful petition for certiorari that the effect of Hopwood would be to make the implementation
(continued...)
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So far we have been talking about issues into which the Constitution does not much intrude, save
in its assignment of executive functions to the President, not the Congress or the courts. The possibilities
of divided government, as well as changes in public mood that occur over time, virtually assure that the
President’s exercise of his functions will be out of step with the preferences of the present Congress, or
what past ones may have wanted when enacting statutes that have not yet been repealed. As the Court
has been reminding us, our direct remedies for any failures these conflicts may represent more often lie in
congressional oversight or the election booth than in the courthouse. Perhaps for just this reason, it does
matter how the President imagines his function, 24 and surely having professional advice of the highest
intelligence – like the Dellinger memorandum – is important to that. Yet it still comes down to a question
of presidential attitude to task. That attitude cannot be commanded from another place, and any assessments of it – political, congressional or judicial – are subject to the same human frailties, temptations and
risks of error as the presidency itself.

23

(...continued)
of such programs impossible, reacted strongly when he learned of this letter, and caused it to be withdrawn. Of course
(one cannot know), the Court’s very reason for denying certiorari might have been that it disbelieved those representations, or that it anticipated that in another (perhaps stronger) case another federal court might reach the opposite result
– even another panel of the Fifth Circuit, precipitating an en banc proceeding. Compare Texas v. Lesage, 68 U.S.L.W.
3351 (Nov. 29, 1999). For the Solicitor General, on the other hand, the risk of losing credibility with the Court must have
seemed very severe – so severe as to warrant requiring the Department now to administer its program differentially
across the nation and to abandon what it regarded as still necessary remedies for the lingering effects of racial
discrimination in the Deep South. The Fifth Circuit panel’s animadversions to the possibilities of punitive damages
provided another strategic basis for counseling retreat. Yet at the level of legal obligation, this dispute is one of those
that, plainly, might have been taken as high as the President and resolved in favor of the Department, against the
Solicitor General; for present purposes the point is that neither outcome could be said in advance of ultimate judicial
resolution to be wrong – either an instruction to withhold enforcement of arguably valid regulations because one court
had found them unconstitutional, or an instruction to continue their enforcement grounded in the President’s own
understanding of the Constitution’s commands.
24

Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 965 (1997).
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When we turn to the issues of constitutionality on which Professor Johnsen chiefly focuses, we
encounter the additional difficulty that what “the laws” are, that our President takes an oath to assure will
“be faithfully executed,” is considerably more complex than it would be in, say, England. In a country with
both a written constitution, constitutional review, and traditions of common law judging, “the laws”
comprise Constitution, statutes, and the existing body of judicial precedent.25 Moreover, the courts have
made clear that, between the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution and the courts’ final authority to say
“what the law is,” statutory text is the least authoritative of these three sources. Once the courts have said
what the Constitution means, an executive acts at his peril in taking actions, including enforcing statutes,
that are inconsistent with that holding, whether or not the particular action or statute itself has
previously been subject to constitutional challenge.26 Once the Supreme Court has said what a statute
means, then in its view even a sensible alternative interpretation presented by executive authority lies
beyond the pale.27

These propositions illustrate, in my judgment, that there is no necessary inconsistency between the

25

Any semantic argument there might be that “the laws” does not extend to all three was surely settled by Erie R. Co.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Moreover, recalling the President’s executive role as primarily one of oversight – at
least in those arenas where legality of action is most likely to be a central concern – should persuade us that to honor
his oath of office, he must be able to consult the Constitution in seeing to the faithful execution of the laws by others.
See text at 3 above.
26

Cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) and Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990) (42 U.S.C. §1983 liability for
statutorily authorized action freshly found unconstitutional in light of Court’s Due Process jurisprudence).
27

Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996)(Once the Court has determined a statute’s meaning, other courts must
“adhere to [tha] ruling under the doctrine of stare decisis, and ... assess an agency’s later interpretation of the statute
against that settled law.”)
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formulae Professor Johnsen has quoted from the Civiletti and Dellinger memoranda –the space within
which she seeks to construct her sophisticated and interesting tertium quid. The phrase she quotes from
Benjamin Civiletti’s letter – written to Congress and so perhaps self-consciously guarded – concerned the
President’s “duty.” Reflecting the Court’s stare decisis practice28 and the liability of executive officers
under Bivens (or, for state executive officials, §1983), he uncontroversially advised that it is the President’s
“duty” to implement the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence where in his judgment the application of that
jurisprudence would be clear – that he has no right to implement a statute that he can say with confidence
the courts would find unconstitutional. A statute granting the FBI the authority to batter down doors in the
middle of the night without a search warrant or other arguable Fourth Amendment authority would not
protect its agents from Bivens liability. Faithful execution of the laws plainly includes the Constitution as
authoritatively interpreted by the courts, and the Supremacy Clause that entitles it to prevail.

Walter Dellinger’s memorandum was written to a friendlier correspondent, the President’s counsel,
and its terms concerned not the President’s “duty” but his “authority” – the extent to which he can claim
what we might analogize to a qualified privilege to act on his own understandings of the Constitution (and,

28

Reflecting Cooper v. Aaron, n. 26 above, that practice in its strongest form appears to demand adherence to
Supreme Court constitutional interpretations as “the supreme law of the land,” to which an oath of office to support and
defend the Constitution commits its taker. Even if one accepted the view, as notably expressed by President Lincoln in
relation to Dred Scott, that further challenges to objectionable precedent could be justified by the hope that the ruling
would be “overruled and never become a precedent for other cases,” (First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861), such
resistance has its limits. “When that chance has been exploited and has run its course, with reaffirmation rather than
reversal of decision, has not the time arrived when its acceptance is demanded, without insisting on repeated litigation?
Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 Colum.L.Rev. 1001, 1008 (1965). Compare the discussion of nonacquiescence, n. 22 above
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one might add, the implications of the Court’s jurisprudence) in situations that a reasonable observer would
not regard as settled by either the text of the Constitution or the decided cases. The two phrases thus
seem to address different issues – the one, what the President must do, as a matter of legal obligation; the
other, what he may do, in exercising the authority of his office. One need not choose between them, or
seek a middle ground.

Indeed, it is in the nature of wielding executive authority, independent of any issue of constitutionality, that the executive will enforce some statutes rather, or more completely or aggressively, than others,
may indeed find that some have been abandoned without having been repealed. The existence of
constitutional issues, with Court attitudes about judicial primacy and finality in constitutional interpretation,
adds to this natural selectivity an element of compulsion or obligation – but is not, in my judgment, its
primary source. The President’s own job calls on him to allocate the resources of government; and, again,
on the whole, judicial supervision of that allocation is both difficult and hazardous to the enterprise of
government. The political – not legal – controls of the election booth, history’s regard, and impeachment
on the one side, the demands of the Constitution and the system of precedent on the other, set a framework within which these allocations are made. We do live in – we demand – a rule-of-law culture. The
Constitution’s faithful execution formulas, in this sense, express a hope for presidential commitment and
enthusiasm. On the whole, we might rather have Presidents who do not test the limits of what they can do,
in fighting either Congress or the Court. But the root proposition is that the President does, of necessity,
have room for his own provisional judgments about what the Constitution means, and the power to act on
- 16 -
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those judgments.

Two matters in the news in the weeks leading up to this conference illustrated the commonality, the
necessity, of such judgments. In The Legal Times of September 13, a feature article29 discusses President
Clinton’s Executive Order 1313230 as well as pending legislation, both of which would sharply limit the
pre-emptive effect of federal action on state regulation. The executive order, of particular interest here,
directs executive agencies to take “action limiting the policymaking discretion of the States [through
preemptive regulatory action] only where the national activity is appropriate in light of the presence of a
problem of national significance” (emphasis added), requires them to consult with state and local officials
before acting to establish uniform national standards, and directs that “where possible,” they must “defer
to the States to establish standards.” These instructions embed a particular view of the arrangements of
federalism – an issue central to our constitutional order – in presidential instructions about how the laws are
to be faithfully executed. We can be quite sure that some of the Congresses that enacted statutes
empowering agency preemption of state law had a differing view, neither anticipating nor wishing such
constraint. In the New York Times of September 26, another article 31 discusses the Fourth Circuit’s
recent decision in United States v/ Dickerson32 resurrecting 18 U.S.C. §3501 – a statute that in 1968

29

Robin Conrad and Jim Wootton, “One Economy, Indivisible?” Legal Times, Sept. 13, 1999, p. 19.

30

64 FR 43255 (August 10, 1999).

31

Roger Parloff, “Miranda on the Hot Seat,” The New York Times Magazine 84 (Sept. 26, 1999).

32

F.3d (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted __ USLW ____ (Mon., Dec. 6, 1999).
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purported to overrule Miranda v. Arizona in federal courts. For the intervening 31 years, following
advice from the Attorney General grounded in the belief that this statute was unconstitutional, federal
prosecutors had simply ignored the statute and followed Miranda (they did not invoke it in Dickerson, but
an amicus was permitted to do so). It was more important, that is, to have police act in a manner that
assured sound convictions, than to follow a course permitted by statute but judged likely to lead to
prosecutorial failures. That advice had survived reexamination early in the Reagan administration.33 What
is to be remarked here, as in relation to the executive order, is that there appears to have been no doubt
or soul-searching about whether this was a directive appropriate for the Attorney General to give –
although her giving that directive pretermitted judicial resolution of constitutionality for 31 years. In the
interim, the make-up of the Court and constitutional doctrine has changed in such a way that a statute long
characterized as “a patently unconstitutional piece of political grandstanding” can now be seen to have a
significant chance of being upheld.34

One could perhaps find a fruitful analogy for thinking about these issues in Justice Jackson’s
famous formula in Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer. Faced there with a claim of inherent presidential authority to take action in the face of national exigency, Justice Jackson suggested a tri-partite analysis
for judicial assessments of presidential action:

33

Parloff at 85, citing Charles Fried, Order and Law: Arguing the Reagan Revolution – A Firsthand Account (1991).

34

At 85, quoting Prof. Yale Kamisar.
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The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial
definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or even single
Articles torn from context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure
liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity. Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their
disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress. We may well begin by a somewhat
over-simplified grouping of practical situations in which a President may doubt, or others
may challenge, his powers, and by distinguishing roughly the legal consequences of this
factor of relativity.

1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his
own right plus all that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these
only, may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty. If his act is held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually
means that the Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks power. ...

2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone
of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which
its distribution is uncertain. ...

3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied
will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his
own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the
matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by
disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power
at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is
at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system. 35

For us, the problem is not one of presidential action, but a decision not to act in the face of congressional
35

343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952).
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authorization and/or congressional will that he do so. Could we suppose similar tripartite advice to a
President concerned to understand his freedom to ignore such directions?

1. When Congress has acted pursuant to an express or implied authorization of the
Constitution, taking account of its interpretation by the courts and the deference owing to
its judgments,36 its authority is at its maximum, and the President’s freedom of action
correspondingly small. He can avoid the conclusion that his oath requires assuring faithful
execution of such laws only by demonstrating one of the ordinary reasons for preferring
the implementation of other laws to this one – the absence of resources, the corrosive
effects of the passage of time, or a conflict of obligations irresolvable by any other means
and with reasons supporting the choice he has made.

2. When the Constitution’s authorization is uncertain and the courts have been silent or
unclear, there is a “zone of twilight” in which he and Congress have concurrent authority
to read the Constitution, subtracting that much further from his obligations concerning the
execution of statutes that might otherwise be thought to lie in his oath. That oath is to see
to the faithful execution of “the laws.” He may rely on his reading of the Constitution as
well as on the more normal factors, until it has been overtaken by judicial decision.

3. When the Congress has taken measures unmistakably incompatible with the expressed
or implied terms of the Constitution, taking account of relevant interpretations by the
courts, the President’s oath of office requires that he give the Constitution preference.

Of course this way of putting it leaves open the various factors Prof. Johnsen has identified, for the difficult
middle ground, but it still may permit us to make a bit of progress respecting them.

36

Published conference papers invariably vary in some respects from what was said at the conference itself. This
is the reader’s gain from what the givers collectively learn there. The footnoted phrase, “and the deference owing to its
judgments,” is one such product – in this case of Prof. Barron’s paper, see p. infra. His proposition, that the room the
courts give Congress for judgment is the product of constitutional imperatives equally applicable to the President, is
forceful and persuasive. Like the Court, the President might find that the extent of deference owning congressional
judgment varies with the circumstances.

- 20 -

Draft of January 27, 2000

Thus, there may be certain political advantages to acting so as to secure judicial review on a
doubtful point; and it is certainly the case that once judicial resolution has been secured, items will tend to
move out of the twilight zone into the brighter-edged territory of options one or three. This is different,
however, from a proposition that seems to recur in Professor Johnsen’s analysis – – that acting to secure
review is, in itself, a factor that bears on the President’s responsibility under his oath. That proposition
subordinates the President as a reader of the Constitution, and elevates the judiciary, in a manner hard to
justify in a government of “co-equal” branches. Constitutional review is, we have accepted, a challenging
necessity of judicial function under a written constitution, not the judiciary’s central, defining function.
Moreover, if we imagine a President who has reached one conclusion – particularly a negative conclusion
– about constitutionality, his pretending to the opposite view on the ground that that is the means by which
judicial review can be assured is, in itself, arguably a violation of his oath. It can hardly be expected he will
take his pretended view with enthusiasm, so that this is not faithful execution in a full sense; and he will
have been a party, in effect, to a friendly suit – to setting up litigation for the purpose of having a disputed
issue of law resolved, in itself an offense to the constitutional function of the judiciary. The Attorneys
General who acted not to secure judicial review of 18 U.S.C. §350137 by failing to invoke it, because they
regarded it as unconstitutional and consequently thought its invocation would obstruct their larger purposes
of securing criminal convictions, were acting within the appropriate parameters of their office.

37

See p. 17 above.
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To take this outside the constitutional context for the moment, consider Sullivan v. United States38
a case involving the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act.39 Under this statute, the Department of Justice
was required to represent service members who had been amerced state or local taxes in arguable
violation of their federal status and certain statutory immunities it entailed. Officers of the Department
successfully appeared for the service members in the lower courts, and filed a Supreme Court brief in
support of the judgment below but, as the Court noted,

The Solicitor General and the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Tax Division of
the Department of Justice have informed the Court, however, that they have not been
persuaded by those arguments, and that they do not believe that §514 was intended to
apply to the ordinary retail sales tax and concomitant use tax now imposed by most of the
States.40

The matter does not figure more largely than this in the Court’s brief opinion unanimously reversing the
holding below and finding against the service members’ immunity tax claims. Still, a witness to the oral
argument at the Court vividly recalls that the only (and rather heated) interest the Justices had in the
government’s oral argument was to know what the government attorney thought he was doing, presenting
a position that did not have the endorsement of his superiors. Repeatedly the question was, “Why and
how are you here?” Was it ‘faithful execution’ to have appeared to press the soldiers’ and sailors’ claims

38

395 U.S. 169 (1969).

39

50 USC Appx 574

40

395 U.S. at 171 n.2.
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at trial? To appear to support the judgment below when it was challenged in the Supreme Court, but in
a manner that virtually assured its reversal? The integrity of the judicial process may be undercut when
parties put forward “for duty’s sake” a position to which, in fact, they do not subscribe.

In the case of constitutional litigation, a statute now requires the Attorney General to notify
Congress that he will not defend the constitutionality of a statute, and for Congress then to substitute its
own attorneys for that purpose.41 That practice answers well to the situation in which the Department of
Justice, without prior involvement, finds itself having to defend the constitutionality of a statute it cannot in
conscience defend. Probably it is better that it hand off responsibility, than make arguments holding its
nose, as it were. But, in the “twilight zone,” is the President required by his oath to act against his own
constitutional judgment so that Congress’s differing judgment will have a day in court? Must he dismiss all,
or at least one,42 HIV-positive serviceman despite his belief that in doing so he is committing an unconstitutional act against a private citizen? Even those who are most dubious about the virtues of judicial constitutional review concede the relative strength of the argument against forced implication in a constitutional
violation; Marbury was a strong case for review precisely because the Court was, by hypothesis, being

41

2 U.S.C. 288c, 288e, 288k.

42

Might he find out, for example, which HIV-positive member is certain to bring/most likely to find the best lawyer
to support him in bringing a challenge to his dismissal, and then delay action on the others pending judicial resolution?
Such “test” litigation is often prudent; if it were not done here, that might be only because of the remedies available
against those who spend government funds without authority to do so. Discussion following the presentation of these
papers at this Symposium strongly suggested that these avenues were explored and that, indeed, the possibility of
litigating success for discharged officers (together with the stealth character of the statute in question, offered at 2 am
in the final throes of considering budgetary legislation) contributed to Congress’ subsequent decision to repeal it.
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asked to cooperate in a constitutional violation. 43 Even before that case, and long before the Tenure of
Office Act imbroglio, President Jefferson relied on similar reasoning to pardon persons convicted under
the Alien and Sedition Acts and, of particular relevance here, to direct that prosecutions under the act
cease, given his conviction – since vindicated by the verdict of history – that it offended the Constitution’s
First Amendment.44 Congress and the people have their political remedies; the possibility of constitutional
review has not become so central that acting to secure it excuses constitutional violations along the way.

Professor Johnsen makes the appealing argument that presidential non-enforcement on constitutional grounds will only distract Congress from its own responsibilities to heed the constitutionality of its
actions. By presuming Congress to have acted constitutionally, the President raises the stakes in congressional legislative judgment, and avoids buck-passing that can be all too easy. Thus, she argues, it was the
43

Notice how Prof. Barron’s analysis, see n. 36 supra, now qualifies this familiar argument – for Court as well as for
President. Both are under a quasi-constitutional obligation to respect Congress's superior call on some issues that they
might think would render a statute suspect. Within the ambit of that obligation to defer, an obligation that varies in
intensity with the nature of the constitutional question being raised, neither is in a position to know that it is being
implicated in unconstitutionality – and so the strong "Marbury" argument would be equally unavailable to either.
44

In a letter of July 22, 1804 to Abigail Adams he wrote:
I discharged every person under punishment or prosecution under the Sedition law, because I
considered, & now consider, that law to be a nullity, as absolute and palpable as if Congress had
ordered us to fall down and worship a golden image; and that it was as much my duty to arrest its
execution in every stage, as it would have been to rescue from the fiery furnace those who should
have been cast into it for refusing to worship their image.

VIII The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 308 n.1, 309 (P. Ford ed. 1897). See also his letters of September 11, 1804 to
Abigail Adams, id at 310, and of September 28, 1820 to William C. Jarvis, 10 id. 160, long staples of discussions of this
problem. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Law 20 (13 th Ed. 1997). The Act provided that
it would cease to be effective on the date of the inauguration of the next President, March 3, 1801, but added that
“expiration of the Act shall not prevent or defeat a prosecution and punishment of any offense against the law, during
the time it shall be in force.” Sec. 4, 1 Stat. 596, 597. Thus, directions to cease prosecuting were as necessary (and
appropriate) as clemency for any who might have been convicted.
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President’s conclusion that he must enforce the HIV statute despite his belief in its unconstitutionality that
led Congress to its own responsible withdrawal of that act. Perhaps, though, the President was impelled
to act, not by the purpose of promoting congressional virtue, but by the realization that he could not avoid
putting individuals at risk – if not the HIV-infected members of the service, then those who would be party
to the continued, statutorily forbidden payment of their salaries. It is no more reasonable to believe that
presidential abstention will teach Congress to take more responsibility for its acts – the acts not of an
individual, but of a 535-member agglomeration that often acts, as here, with few of its members actually
aware of the legislative judgments being made – than it is to think that “plain language” interpretation will
make of them better drafters.45 Nor can such an attitude be found in the Constitution, which insists on the
equality of all branches and, at least under judicial instruction, precludes one branch from acting under
hypotheses that disrespect another.

Perhaps the HIV statute also implicates the President’s own authority as commander in chief (and
head of executive government in general). While the class of HIV-positives is not closed, it has been
irrevocably joined for those already in it, and quite possibly in an entirely innocent manner. Congress
45

See, e.g. Francis Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics 31 (1839):
The British spirit of civil liberty induced the English judges to adhere strictly to the law, to its exact
expressions. This again induced the law-makers to be, in their phraseology, as explicit and minute as
possible, which causes such a tautology and endless repetition in the statutes of that country that
even so eminent a statesman as Sir Robert Peel declared, in parliament, that he "contemplates no task
with so much distaste as the reading through an ordinary act of parliament." Men have at length
found out that little or nothing is gained by attempting to speak with absolute clearness and endless
specifications, but that human speech is the clearer, the less we endeavor to supply by words and
specifications that interpretation which common sense must give to human words. However minutely
we may define, somewhere we needs must trust at last to common sense and good faith.
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cannot pass bills of attainder; it cannot force itself upon the President’s function of removing officers of the
United States for the good of the service.46 This is perhaps not so strong an argument, but it permits a
moment’s consideration of the proposition that the promise of assuring the faithful execution of the laws has
special meaning when the President’s own authority is at stake, so that his actions involve what might be
thought an element of self-defense. At the very least, one could say, this statute requires the President, as
he sees it, to embarrass himself in leading the Armed Forces – whichever course would have in his
judgment that effect.47 Again what seems relevant to note is that strategic thinking – deciding what course
will make it more likely that, ultimately, his view of his own authority will prevail in competition with the
Congress’s – has its own implications for the idea of faithful execution. Duty can be commanded, but not
enthusiasm, and enthusiasm in particular instances is the more likely as one concludes that one’s position
is one of equality, independence and respect.

To paraphrase a remark Richard Posner made about judicial interpretation of statutes,48 an
irresponsible President will have his way whatever approach we may urge; and a stupid one will blunder.
What we are seeking is an understanding for the President of good faith, who wants to know what it is his
to do. It is in my judgment a considerable mistake to suggest to him a view of “the laws,” the faithful
execution of which he has undertaken to assure, that is any narrower than the whole, as he conscionably
46

Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).

47

A President might conclude that painfully obeying a (perhaps valid) law with which he did not agree was of the
essence of leadership in dealing with the military.
48

Richard Posner, Statutory Interpretation – In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U.Chi.L.Rev. 800, 817 (1983).
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and attentively understands them to be. As Professor Barron so thoughtfully suggests,49 that understanding
will embrace an acceptance of the relevant competences of Congress and courts, each in its respective
sphere; but it leaves room as well for the exercise, in that light, of his own.

49

Infra, p.

.
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